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External administration in corporate insolvency
and reorganisation: The insider alternative
Larelle Chapple and James Routledge*
This article considers the merits of alternative policy approaches to manage-
ment of companies in insolvency administration, in particular from an identity
economics theoretical perspective. The use of this perspective provides a
novel assessment of the policy alternatives for insolvency administration,
which can be characterised as either following the more flexible United States
Chapter 11-style debtor-in-possession arrangement, or relying on the appoint-
ment of an external administrator or trustee to manage the insolvent company,
who automatically displaces incumbent management. This analysis indicates
that stigma and reputational damage from automatic removal of managers in
voluntary administration leads to “identity loss” and that an insider alternative
to the current external administration approach could be a beneficial policy
change.
INTRODUCTION
Exploring the dynamics of decision-making by company managers when they are faced with severe
financial distress or insolvency is an area of continuing importance for insolvency research. A critical
decision that confronts managers is whether to enter insolvency administration. The ramifications of
the decision are significant in that, upon entry, the legal processes of the administration procedure will
intervene significantly in the day-to-day operations, governance and contracts of the company.
Unsurprisingly, prior research has shown that the nature of the insolvency process and the extent of its
intervention in the company’s affairs have a substantial influence on the decision by managers to enter
administration.1
This article focuses on the decision by company directors to enter voluntary administration (VA),
which is the reorganisation option for insolvent companies in the Australian Corporations Act 2001
(Cth). In particular, it considers how the VA legislation’s requirement for automatic replacement of
incumbent management with an external administrator2 impacts on the decision to enter VA. The
authors address the question whether this policy approach promotes optimal decision-making around
the circumstances of insolvency. This is an important question because other jurisdictions have
successfully implemented insolvency administration laws that allow incumbent managers to continue
in their managerial roles during insolvency administration. This alternative approach is often referred
to as “debtor-in-possession” administration, and is a well-known feature of reorganisation law in
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (US Chapter 11). The comparison between the two
broad approaches is not new – the Companies and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) in its
2003 Report, “Rehabilitating Large and Complex Enterprises in Financial Difficulties”3 examined the
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1 Hahn D, “Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations” (2004) 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies
117; Donoher WJ, “To File or Not To File? Systematic Incentives, Corporate Control, and the Bankruptcy Decision” (2004) 30
Journal of Management 239.
2 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 437A.
3 CAMAC, “Rehabilitating Large and Complex Enterprises in Financial Difficulties” (Discussion Paper, 2003).
US Chapter 11 but largely decided against adopting any of its features. This shows that there are
“elements of dissatisfaction”4 with both approaches but this article will re-examine the incentives that
directors operate under in making the administration decision, from a theory perspective rather than a
legislative imperative. Of interest is that a recent comprehensive review by the American Bankruptcy
Institute Commission affirmed the debtor-in-possession approach in Chapter 11 as providing an
appropriate balance and that it should continue as the default rule.5
This article considers the effect that removal of incumbent managers has on decision-making and
governance prior to the insolvency administration commencing. It suggests the automatic removal of
incumbent managers creates adverse incentives in the pre-administration period, and can undermine
corporate governance as financial distress takes hold. It argues there is an incentive for managers to
sub-optimally delay the decision to enter VA because automatic removal is damaging to their
reputation and has a stigmatising effect. This viewpoint is supported by application of theory
developed by Akerlof and Kranton,6 which highlights the importance of identity to decision-making.
The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that consideration should be given to relaxing the VA
requirement for removal of incumbent managers. This article also suggests that reshaping VA policy
from a purely “external” administration process, to a regime that permits “insider” involvement could
improve efficiency.
Prior literature has discussed the differences between the external administration approach in the
VA legislation and the debtor-in-possession approach.7 In addition, suggestions have been made about
how the policy settings embodied in these approaches could be adjusted to improve governance in the
context of insolvency administration.8 This article adds to the extant work by focusing on the effects
of insolvency administration policy on the decision-making of company managers in the period
leading up to insolvency. In doing so, the authors draw upon a range of research from across business
and law disciplines to present evidence as to the deleterious effects of the “stigma of bankruptcy” on
the individuals involved in corporate distress. The decisions made in this lead-in period are of equal
significance to those made during the insolvency administration. In particular, whether managers
decide to make a timely entry into insolvency administration has been shown to have a substantial
correlation with the probability of company rescue and rehabilitation of the company.9 Thus, the
overall quality of governance in the pre-administration period will have implications for the
company’s future prospects, and the effects of poor governance often cannot be undone in
administration regardless of its form. Therefore, the authors’ aim is to highlight and discuss whether
insolvency policy enhances governance and decision-making in the pre-administration period rather
than create adverse incentives.
4 Anderson C and Morrison D, “The Commencement of the Company Rescue: How and When Does it Start?” in Omar P (ed),
International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2013).
5 American Bankruptcy Institute, “Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 Final Report and Recommendations” (2014)
available at http://www.commission.abi.org. The report, at p 21, recommends the continuation of the debtor-in-possession
approach, which “allows the debtor to continue operations with minimal disruptions while still serving the interests of the
debtor’s creditors”.
6 Akerlof GA and Kranton RE, “Economics and Identity” (2000) 150 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 715.
7 Hahn, n 1; McCormack G, “Control and Corporate Rescue – an Anglo-American Evaluation” (2007) 56 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 515; Rotem Y, “Contemplating a Corporate Governance Model for Bankruptcy Reorganizations:
Lessons from Canada” (2008) 3 Virginia Law & Business Review 125.
8 Adams ES, “Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results” (1993) 73 Boston University
Law Review 581; Frost CW, “The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganisations”
(1998) 72 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 103; Eow I, “The Door to Reorganisation: Strategic Behaviour or Abuse of
Voluntary Administration?” (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 11.
9 Routledge J and Morrison D, “Insolvency Administration as a Strategic Response to Financial Distress” (2012) 37 Australian
Journal of Management 441; Routledge J and Morrison D, “Voluntary Administration: Patterns of Corporate Decline” (2009) 27
C&SLJ 95; Routledge J, “The Decision to Enter Voluntary Administration: Timely Strategy or Last Resort?” (2007) 6 Journal
of Law and Financial Management 8.
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EXTERNAL ADMINISTRATION VERSUS DEBTOR- IN-POSSESSION
While insolvency reorganisation arrangements are found in the law of most jurisdictions, there is
considerable variation in the policy approach to framing the law. One important difference is how the
legal mechanism treats company management once the insolvency procedure commences. The two
main approaches can be identified as:
1) debtor-in-possession arrangements similar to the US Chapter 11 scheme where incumbent
managers may remain in office; or,
2) the mandate for appointment of an external administrator or trustee to take over management of
the insolvent company;10 for example, the administration provisions of the United Kingdom’s
Insolvency Act 1986, and the Australian voluntary administration procedure in Pt 5.3A of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
Accordingly, the key distinction between both relates to the position, or identity, of management
once the company enters insolvency administration. Under the debtor-in-possession approach the
debtor company retains control and incumbent management is not automatically removed. Existing
management may continue, subject to creditor and court supervision.11 In the external administration
model, the administrator is a professional insolvency practitioner,12 who has never been a manager of
the company, but who is also under direct supervision of creditors and indirect supervision of the
court. The powers of other officers are automatically suspended while the company is in
administration.13 In relation to the treatment of incumbent managers, the two approaches are described
as holding to an “all-or-nothing” approach in relation to incumbent management.14
Prior literature has considered these different policy approaches and has applied an agency
theoretical lens to assess their efficacy. For example, Hahn15 discusses how the interests of managers,
creditors and shareholders might affect decision-making in the context of financial distress and
impending entry into insolvency administration. His paper provides an account of management
decision-making based on the propensity of managers as agents to maximise their own economic
interests. Hahn shows the suitability of debtor-in-possession and external administration arrangements
depend on the level of ownership concentration, with the former suited to widely dispersed ownership
and the latter suited to concentrated ownership. The basis for Hahn’s conclusion is that a greater
separation of management and ownership means existing management is in a better position to
“exercise its own business judgement” rather than making decisions that favour shareholders’
interests.16 This is because the lack of ownership concentration reduces the likelihood that
shareholders will be in a position to influence management decisions to the detriment of creditors.
Regarding external administration, commentary from the early stages predicted abuse of process
by self-interested incumbent management as potential criticism of the regime.17 Fridman18 in 2003
provided extensive critique. The potential for abuse of process stems primarily from the low threshold
10 The international literature tends to refer to this as the “trustee” model; but the authors refer to it as the “administration” model
as a more familiar description. The administrator once appointed is an officer of the company, not a trustee in the traditional
sense, and is explicitly referred to as an agent of the company in ss 9 and 437B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
11 The retention of incumbent management is not assured in the Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession provisions. On application of a
creditor, or of its own volition, the court may appoint a trustee in circumstances where there is cause based on fraud or
dishonesty or where it is in the interests of creditors and shareholders (see generally U.S. Code Chapter 11, s 1104). In addition,
empirical evidence suggests a reasonably high turnover of management around Chapter 11 reorganisations (see Gilson S,
“Management Turnover and Financial Distress” (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 241).
12 Section 448B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) requires the administrator is a registered liquidator to be eligible for
appointment:
13 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 437C.
14 Rotem, n 7 at 126; McCormack, n 7.
15 Hahn, n 1.
16 Hahn, n 1 at 130.
17 Rose M and Law L, “Voluntary Administration: Will They Work?” (1995) 3 Insolv LJ 11.
18 Fridman S, “Voluntary Administration: Use and Abuse” (2003) 15 Bond Law Review article 17.
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test required for directors to select external administration – a belief that the company is unable to pay
its debts.19 From this point, he asserted that management could manipulate the process to appoint an
administrator, either for example to avoid an impending investigation by another authority,20 or to
bring about a restructuring of capital or governance21 under the veil of insolvency that avoids
shareholder approval in normal circumstances, such as under a scheme of arrangement. Similarly,
Eow22 documented other types of abuse of process open to incumbent management under the external
administration procedure, such as stalling of pre-existing litigation,23 or to disrupt claims by
employees against the company.24
While analysis of insolvency decision-making based on agency theory is intuitive and helpful,
there is empirical evidence that indicates careful thought should be given to the motivations of
managers. For example, Donoher25 investigated the entry by US firms into the Chapter 11
reorganisation scheme. The expectation was that higher levels of management equity ownership
reduce agency conflicts, thereby resulting in managers having the firm enter Chapter 11 earlier rather
than later. Contrary to expectations based on agency analysis, he found that firms with managers
holding more equity entered into Chapter 11 in worse financial condition than those with managers
holding less equity. Donoher suggested the result was consistent with managers being willing to
forego the value of their equity holding to avoid the reputational damage and loss of employment
capital that could arise from delaying entry into Chapter 11. Consistent with this, the authors argue
that analysis of how policy impacts management decision-making in the insolvency context should
include consideration of economic interests as per the traditional agency approach, but that it should
also take account of reputational effects. The economics of identity which is discussed in this article
provides a suitable framework for this analysis.
Various papers have addressed the issue of management treatment in insolvency administration.
They demonstrate the inherent difficulty with designing policy that ensures good governance and
results in managerial decisions that maximises insolvent company value.26 What has emerged is a
view that automatic removal of incumbent managers is unnecessary, if the continuation of incumbent
management is combined with appropriate independent monitoring to minimise agency problems.
Adams, in his analysis of the Chapter 11 reorganisation provisions, suggests a bifurcated
debtor-in-possession approach would overcome problems of self-interested decision-making by
managers in Chapter 11.27 His model suggests monitoring should be provided by an appointed trustee
who works along with knowledgeable incumbent managers during the insolvency administration.
Rotem28 offers a thorough comparison of the debtor-in-possession and external administration
approaches. He points out that neither offers a robust solution to the complexities of ensuring good
governance for insolvent companies, and recommends a hybrid version of the type discussed by
19 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 436A.
20 Kazar v Duus (1998) 29 ACSR 321.
21 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328. See also Anderson C and Morrison D, “Seen but not Heard? The
Significance of Shareholders under Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act” (2008) 16 Insolv LJ 222 at 225-256.
22 Eow, n 8.
23 Blacktown City Council v Macarthur Telecommunications Pty Ltd (2003) 47 ACSR 391.
24 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] HCA 30; (1998) 195 CLR 1. See also
Spender P, “Scenes from a Wharf: Containing the Morality of Corporate Law” in MacMillan F (ed), International Corporate
Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000). Appointment of an external administrator may also be problematic in situations of
conflicting interests. Relevant discussion of this issue is found in Routledge J, “Voluntary Administration and Commercial
Morality: Aligning the Competing Interests” (1997) 5 Insolv LJ 125 and Sarra J, “Ethics and Conflicts, The Role of Insolvency
Professionals in the Integrity of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency System” (2004) 13 International Insolvency Review
167.
25 Donoher, n 1.
26 Frost, n 8.
27 Adams, n 8.
28 Rotem, n 7.
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Adams.29 Rotem30 provides a critique of the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 1985,
which allows for a court appointed monitor to work with incumbent management, and suggests this
hybrid approach is a useful policy model.31 The following analysis suggests a significant detrimental
effect from the automatic removal of incumbent managers upon entry into insolvency. Therefore, the
insider arrangements suggested by Adams and Rotem could be a suitable alternative policy approach.
Overall, the prior literature highlights that neither the debtor-in-possession or administration
approach offers a complete solution to ensuring optimal governance of insolvent companies. This
article adds to the existing analysis and understanding of the two policy approaches by highlighting
the adverse incentives in the pre-administration period created by the removal of incumbent managers.
The authors also introduce the economics of identity as an alternative theoretical lens through which
the two approaches can be analysed.
THE RELEVANCE OF IDENTITY
Corporate law traditionally relies on the agency argument to explain the motivations of directors,
particularly non-executive or independent directors, to act in the interests of the company. This can be
traced back to Fama and Jensen,32 who argued that personal reputation provides a powerful motivating
force for director conduct. Despite the appealing intuition of using agency theory to understand
decision-making by managers, there is emerging inconsistency in its ability to predict behaviour.33 It is
apparent that the standard agency analysis is only useful when people’s preferences are consistent with
the typical prescriptions that are assigned to them by economists.34 For this reason, the authors suggest
it is useful to adopt a broader perspective when considering the issue of management decision-making
in the insolvency context. Sunstein35 suggests that advances in understanding of how people actually
make decisions through social science research provide a useful basis for legal analysis. Jolls, Sunstein
and Thaler argue that by “drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems … behavioural
law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis”.36 Accordingly,
the authors consider theory from behavioural economics to enhance their understanding of
management decisions for insolvent companies. Specifically, this article considers the economics of
identity, which shows a person’s sense of self is an important aspect of economic behaviour.
It should also be emphasised that this expanded perspective of economic behaviour does not
supplant the traditional agency model. The economics of identity is founded on the view that the sense
of self is an important aspect of a person’s utility function. Agency theory is linked to economic
utilitarianism – that individuals can be expected to behave in a way that enhances their utility.37
29 Adams, n 8.
30 Rotem, n 7.
31 The arrangement is only available to companies with debts in excess of CAD5 million. For a discussion of Canadian
insolvency provisions see Sarra J, “Entre Loup Chien: Restructuring Under Canadian Insolvency Law and Proposals for
Regulatory Reform” (2003) 12 International Insolvency Review 83.
32 Fama E and Jensen M, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301.
33 Donoher, n 1; Cuevas-Rodriguez G, Gomez-Mejia L and Wiseman R, “Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the
Theory More Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems” (2012) 20 Corporate Governance: An International
Review 526.
34 Akerlof GA, “The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics” (2007) 97 The American Economic Review 3.
35 Sunstein CR, “Behavioural Analysis of Law” (Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics – Second Series, Number 46,
1997).
36 Jolls C, Sunstein C and Thaler R, “A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics” (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471 at
1471. Interest in how behavioural economics can inform regulation is evident from recent reports released by the Australian
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). The reports were commissioned by ASIC to examine market and consumer
behaviour, and relied on behavioural experiments. ASIC Chairman Greg Medcraft noted the “studies provide valuable insights
into how people make decisions and how ASIC can improve outcomes”. ASIC intends to apply behavioural economics to
inform its policy strategy. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Increasing Use of Behavioural
Economics Across its Regulatory Business (2015) available at http://www.asic.gov.au.
37 Cuevas-Rodriguez, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, n 33.
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Identity economics adds consideration of identity into the utility function, and the authors
demonstrate that issues of identity can loom large for managers of insolvent companies. As discussed,
evidence suggests that financial incentives are not a strong enough explanation for director conduct38
and directors will trade-off other factors, such as the ability to develop a reputation and the
opportunity to acquire other board positions, against low cash payment and remuneration.39 That
reputation is a strong motivator for director behaviour was confirmed in a recent empirical study by
Masulis and Mobbs that examined the market for directorships.40 Their results showed that reputation
is a valuable commodity, and that preserving and enhancing reputation is a primary motivation of
directors.41 Managers of financially distressed companies face a new set of circumstances, and the
authors speculate, face a new set of trade-offs for their reputation. As stated by Bernstein:
Corporate restructuring represents a multi-stage balancing act. Unlike a healthy firm, where there is
more than enough value to go around, a financially distressed firm comes up short by definition. It is at
that point when divergent interests are most apparent, including shareholder-creditor conflicts,
creditor-creditor conflicts, management-stakeholder conflicts, and individual-organizational conflicts.42
The conflicted position of managers and the threat to their reputation is evident from prior
analysis. The potential impact of an insolvency event on managerial positions is demonstrated in an
early study by Gilson.43 The analysis showed that for a sample of companies that experienced a period
of financial distress (default, bankruptcy, or debt restructuring outside bankruptcy), 52% made a
senior-level management change during the distress period. Moreover, senior managers (CEO,
Chairman and president) who lost their board positions did not hold a senior management position in
another listed company in the subsequent three years. This early study on the senior management
labour market suggests that insolvency can have profound implications for the personal reputation of
managers.44
38 Adams R and Ferreira D, “Do Directors Perform for Pay?” (2008) 46 Journal of Accounting and Economics 154.
39 Yermack D, “Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors” (2004) 59 Journal of Finance 228.
40 Masulis R and Mobbs S, “Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and
Energy?” (2014) 111 Journal of Financial Economics 406.
41 Masulis and Mobbs, n 40 at 426.
42 Bernstein E, “All’s Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial
Distress” (2006) 11 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 289 at 324. Our focus is on how insolvency law addresses the
issue of who should manage the company once administration commences and how this influences management behaviour in
the period prior to insolvency administration. It is acknowledged that other legal provisions can influence manager behaviour.
For example, most jurisdictions hold managers accountable to creditors if they continue to carry on business when insolvent.
Successful prosecution for breach of an insolvent or wrongful trading provision can also open managers to significant penalties.
The consequences of breaching these provisions also becomes one of the trade-offs considered by managers. A substantive
discussion of the economic incentives created by the U.K. wrongful trading provisions is found in Mokal RJ, “An Agency Cost
Analysis of the Wrongful Trading Provisions: Redistribution, Perverse Incentives and the Creditors’ Bargain” (2000) 59
Cambridge Law Journal 335. In the Australian setting, James, Ramsay and Polat conducted an empirical study of insolvent
trading cases from 1970 to 2004. They located 103 cases during that time, with 77 resulting in the defendant found liable for
insolvent trading. The median compensation order was $110,598 and only seven cases resulted in pecuniary penalties or
disqualification orders being made against the defendants. The low incidence of actions for insolvent trading and the limited
extent of compensation orders and penalties is not suggestive of a substantial influence on management behaviour in the
Australian context (see James P, Ramsay I and Siva P, “Insolvent Trading – An Empirical Study” (2004) 12 Insolv LJ 210). See
also MacFarlane A, “Safe Harbour Reforms – Should Insolvent Trading Provisions Be Reformed” (2010) 18 Insolv LJ 138;
Purslowe R, “Decisions in the Twilight Zone of Insolvency – Should Directors be Afforded a New Safe Harbour?” (2011) 13
University of Notre Dame Law Review 113, for further discussion of the incentives of insolvent trading provisions in the
Australian setting.
43 Gilson n 11.
44 The analysis by Gilson, n 11 was for larger companies. For managers of smaller firms, the implications of insolvency for the
future value of their labour market capital are not so pronounced because they are less likely to be concerned about competing
for management positions. However, we suggest the substantial management turnover for distressed companies is an indication
of the overall negative reputational effect of being identified as a manager of a company that enters insolvency administration
regardless of company size. As indicated by Jackson and Scott, managers of smaller closely-held firms are more likely have
made a substantial non-monetary idiosyncratic or firm-specific investment in the company, which is reflected in expressions such
as “it’s my life’s work” and “my name is over the door” (see Jackson TH and Scott RE, “The Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
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In explaining the link between the economics of identity, reputation and the law, Hill observes
that bankruptcy is a status or identity, and that “the rhetoric of bankruptcy law has been to emphasize
that the identity is only transient – one can ‘make a fresh start’”.45 However, Hill speaks of a tension
between the fresh start perspective of bankruptcy and “a general ‘future is like the past view’” where
the bankrupt’s identity is immutable.46 This indicates the substantial consequences of an insolvency
event on identity.
Empirical analysis by Bernstein shows that, since the introduction of the Chapter 11
reorganisation law in the United States, the difference in the rate of CEO turnover between bankrupt
and non-bankrupt company restructuring has become insignificant. This suggests an increasing
willingness to use the legal bankruptcy process as governance tool as “the stigma associated with
corporations filing for bankruptcy has been deteriorating”.47 This analysis shows the need for careful
analysis of legal policy due to potential impacts on governance systems and related decision-making.
It is evident that broader analysis than that offered by agency theory is warranted. Overall, it can
be concluded that in addition to financial concerns managers are motivated by concern for their
reputation. Insolvency can cause significant harm to reputation. However, the structure of insolvency
law and whether it adds to reputational damage can affect decision-making by managers. Examination
of this concern for reputation can be formalised by considering the economics of identity, which is
discussed in the next section.
THE ECONOMICS OF IDENTITY
The notion that identity, or a person’s sense of self, is an important aspect of economic behaviour was
presented in the seminal paper by Akerlof and Kranton.48 Their paper demonstrated how identity can
influence economic outcomes, and demonstrated this in the areas of gender discrimination, labour
markets, household division of labor, social exclusion and poverty. There is an emerging literature that
has considered how identity preferences operate in a business setting, including in the management
discipline,49 behavioural economics discipline,50 accounting51 and law.52 In this article, the Akerlof
and Kranton53 (hereafter referred to as AK) concept of identity is applied to explain economic
outcomes in the area of insolvency.
AK outline the importance of identity to economic behaviour by demonstrating that a person’s
utility function incorporates identity. Identity is based on social categories, with each category
enjoying different social status and self-image. Utility is dependent on how well a person’s own
characteristics match those considered to be the ideal of their identity category. It is also dependent on
whether others within a social category behave in a manner that corresponds with the prescribed
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain” 75 Virginia Law Review 155 at 174.) Thus, the authors suggest the stigma
and reputational damage of automatic removal in insolvency for these managers is as significant as it is for managers of large
corporations.
45 Hill C, “The Law and Economics of Identity” (2007) 32 Queens Law Journal 389 at 437.
46 Hill, n 45 at 437.
47 Bernstein, n 42 at 322.
48 Akerlof and Kranton (2000), n 6.
49 Alvesson M and Willmott H, “Identity Regulation as Organizational Control: Producing the Appropriate Individual” (2002)
39 Journal of Management Studies 619; Alvesson M and Robertson M, “The Best and Brightest: The Construction, Significance
and Effects of Elite Identities in Consulting Firms” (2006) 13 Organization 195; Ravasi D and Phillips N, “Strategies of
Alignment: Orgaizational Identity Management and Strategic Change at Bang & Olufson”, (2011) 9 Organization 103; Sutton R
and Callahan AL, “The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational Image and its Management” (1987) 30 Academy of
Management Journal 405.
50 Akerlof G and Kranton R, “Identity, Supervision, and Workgroups” (2008) 98 American Economic Review 212.
51 Heinle MS, Hofman C and Kunz AH, “Identity, Incentives, and the Value of Information” (2012) 87 The Accounting Review
1309.
52 Langevoort DC, “Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of
Financial Risk Taking” (2011) 96 Cornell Law Review 1209.
53 Akerlof and Kranton (2000), n 6.
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behaviour of the category. Thus, utility maximisation can be achieved by a person electing to be part
of a social category (where this is possible) and by their making choices that are consistent with the
ideal of the category. In addition, utility can be affected by whether the choices of others in the
category are consistent with the ideal of the category. Violation of the internalised standards of an
identity can result in strong negative emotions, with a resulting loss of utility for an individual. AK
refer to “gains or losses in identity” resulting from whether they or others fail live up to beliefs
regarding what people of the category should do.54
Of relevance to this article is that AK offer examples showing that people are sometimes able to
choose their identity. Hill provides specific examples of this in the corporate context.55 For example,
she asserts that “corporate executive”, is a category of identity. She discusses two aspects of this
identity – those who get their identity pay-off from “pushing the envelope”56 (that is, playing close to
the rules, but not by the rules) and those who are motivated by “something quite different” –
sacrificing material rewards for something else. The economics of identity can assist with
understanding these two perceived categories of managers because the authors see their actions as
being consistent with different group ideals provide identity gains or losses. In the corporate law
setting, the authors may see this described as the inherent tension between those corporate managers
who build their reputation as financial managers by acting, not as a trustee, but exhibiting
entrepreneurial flair in managing company funds;57 and those who seek to protect their personal
reputations through general monitoring and managing the company’s decisions.
Also of relevance is that social identity categories and internalised behaviour can be
manipulated.58 Hill observes that because people’s choice is related to identity, it is possible for
policy-makers to “create, encourage, discourage, or otherwise recognize and address identity oriented
efforts that may result in behaviour that society finds problematic”.59 Thus, identity can be used to
encourage desirable behaviour and discourage undesirable behaviour. This is important because it
suggests recognition of identity in the development of insolvency law can influence economic
outcomes.
INSOLVENCY AND IDENTITY
It is evident that corporate insolvency, and particularly the entry by companies into insolvency
administration, has an unfavourable stigmatising effect on the credibility of top managers.
There is a substantial literature that has addressed the significant stigma associated with
insolvency. For example, Sutton and Callahan present analysis of firms that enter Chapter 11 of the US
Federal Bankruptcy Code and show that stakeholders of these firms viewed senior managers as tainted
and incompetent people. They further suggest that managers experienced career damage,
embarrassment, anger and a loss of self-esteem.60 Recent empirical research in management shows
that executives who change employers (or “jump-ship” as they refer to it) in the two years prior to
company failure suffer fewer labor market consequences than those who remain.61 Weisenfeld,
Wurthmann, and Hambrick describe the process of stigmatisation of those connected with corporate
failure. They describe the process as advancing through phases including: stigmatisation of a group or
54 Akerlof and Kranton (2000), n 6 at 719. See also Akerlof GA, “Economics and Identity” Stamp Lecture – London School of
Economics (25 April 2007).
55 Hill, n 45 at 422-423.
56 Hill, n 45 at 422-423. Langevoort describes this behaviour as traits such as (inter alia) over-optimism, inflated sense of self
and self-deception, see Langevoort DC, “Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls” (2004) 93 Georgia Law Journal 285 at 299-300.
57 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 at 65.
58 Akerlof and Kranton (2000), n 6 at 726.
59 Hill, n 45 at 393.
60 Sutton and Callaghan, n 49.
61 Semadeni M, Cannella A, Fraser DR and Lee DS, “Fight or Flight: Managing Stigma in Executive Careers” (2008) 29
Strategic Management Journal 557.
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all associated with a firm, singling out of one or two elites that are specifically identified for blame;
stigma diffusion through repeated reports of an expanding list of perceived misdeeds; and, eventually
professional devaluation. The process of stigmatisation results in emotional pain and a spoiled identity
for corporate elites, which reduces their standing in the market for managerial services.62 It has also
been shown that stakeholders render judgment on the circumstances of the financial failure, including
subjective interpretations about the actions of individuals. The research describes how information
cues shape outsiders’ perceptions of competency and ability. Assessment by outsiders depends on the
locus of causality, that is, whether the cause of failure is attributable to internal or external factors.
Thus, outsiders’ judgment of organisational failure is subjective and dependent on information cues
and perceptions of causality. Importantly, the judgment process either “stigmatises or strengthens
individuals and organisations after the event”.63
Of course in some cultures, the extent of negative implications of bankruptcy and failure can be
catastrophic at the individual level. For example, in Japan, research has shown a negative relation
between suicide rates and the number of rehabilitation court petitions filed in the sample period from
2001 to 2002. The civil rehabilitation scheme offers an alternative to bankruptcy that allows
individuals to negotiate a plan with creditors. The scheme is less stigmatising and offers a more
expedient, user friendly and affirmative means of addressing personal financial problems.64 While the
Japanese scheme applies to personal bankruptcy, the study emphasises the potential impact of stigma
associated with business failure. An important point is that the study’s findings show insolvency law
“plays a role in controlling debt and in mitigating the social stigma of indebtedness”.65
This understanding of the negative identity consequences of entry into insolvency administration
points to an identity loss for managers.66 Managers of failed companies are identified as exhibiting
characteristics and engaging in behaviour that is inconsistent with the ideal of a “competent manager”.
The stigmatisation represents a loss in utility.
INSOLVENCY POLICY AND IDENTITY
Companies enter insolvency administration at very different stages of decline or states of financial
distress.67 Delaying entry into administration increases the chance that a company’s decline is so
protracted that there is little or no chance of reorganisation and survival. Ideally, managers will make
a decision to enter administration at a time when the likelihood of successful reorganisation is high.
Information asymmetry provides opportunity for managers to make self-serving decisions.68 Company
managers know more about capacity to repay debt and the level of profitability than lenders and
shareholders. The relevance of agency analysis in this context is obvious, and such analysis would
lead to the conclusion that managers will delay entering administration when it is in their interest to do
so. The authors argue that the prospect of identity loss discussed in the previous section increases the
propensity for managers to engage in self-interested delaying behaviour.
The authors suggest that identity economics analysis points to a decreased likelihood of optimal
entry into administration when the law requires removal of incumbent managers. Because managers
are generally not able to effectively diversify employment risk, the threat of removal can lead to
62 Weisenfeld BM, Wurthmann KA and Hambrick DC, “The Stigmatization and Devaluation of Elites Associated with
Corporate Failures: A Process Model” (2008) 33 Academy of Management Review 231 at 233-234.
63 Amankwhah-Amoah J, “Cauterising Trial by Fire: Observers’ Interpretations of Organisational Failure” (2013) 38 Journal of
General Management 51 at 66.
64 West M, “Dying to get out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Suicide in Japan” (University of Michigan Law School
Law and Economics Working Papers, 2003) available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/law econ archive/art21.
65 West, n 64 at 6.
66 Akerlof and Kranton (2000), n 6 at 719.
67 Donohor, n 1.
68 Akerlof GA, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism” (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 488.
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opportunistic behaviour.69 The risk of losing reputation looms large in the context of a company
experiencing financial distress. The prospect of insolvency brings the prospect loss of employment,
and significantly diminished prospects for future employment and earnings capacity. As Fama argues,
the labour market rewards or penalises managers according to their ability to bring about favourable
outcomes for an organisation.70 Along with more tangible effects of organisational failure is the loss of
utility from identity loss. The side-lining of managers in VA will undoubtedly promote the immutable
“future is like the past view” with a resultant identity loss.71 Removal of incumbent managers signals
they have failed in their management role in a way that has led to insolvency, and that they are
incapable of properly managing the company through the distress period. The VA system of removing
existing managers provides a strong negative cue about competency and ability.72 The utility to
managers of entering administration is thus adversely affected.
Prior studies offer insight as to how managers will respond to identity threats. Identity threat is
defined as “experiences appraised as indicating potential harm to the value, meanings, or enactment of
an identity”,73 with two responses to threats: identity-protection responses and identity restructuring
responses. An identity-protection response involves strategies of derogation of parties that are the
source of the threat, concealment or downplaying the identity or creating a positive distinctiveness for
the threatened identity. In contrast, identity restructuring strategies involve changing the meaning or
importance of an identity, or disengaging from the threatened identity. In the VA context, current
legislation limits the options of managers in responding to identity threats associated with financial
distress. Entering VA brings about the removal of incumbent management and appointment of an
administrator, which arguably defines managers as failures. This largely removes the possibility that
management can work to promote an identity to that of managers of a distressed company who are
taking the necessary and appropriate steps to deal with financial distress. This increases the incentive
for managers faced with financial distress to engage in derogation or concealment behaviour, which
are unlikely to be productive in dealing with the complex issues of potential business failure
A further issue with the VA approach is the increased likelihood of a drain of management
resources as the company moves toward financial distress and the prospect of organisational crisis
becomes more apparent. Crisis situations are a context where the resources and skills of competent
managers are most needed.74 However, it is also a context where there is an increased likelihood of
company director resignation in an attempt to protect their reputation and find alternative
employment.75 In particular, models developed by Withers, Corley and Hillman indicate that directors
that are less closely connected with the board are more likely to resign their position in the context of
organisational crises. This represents loss of a significant and valuable input by independent directors.
It is suggested that the VA approach to dealing with incumbent managers is likely to exacerbate this
drain of management resources as financial distress related problems become apparent.
The Australian regime provides some incentive for directors to prefer the administration choice, if
only to provide potential protection in the event of a subsequent insolvent trading action against them
personally. There is a defence if directors take positive steps to prevent the company from trading
69 Amihud Y and Lev B, “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers” (1981) 12 The Bell Journal of
Economics 605.
70 Fama E, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288.
71 Hill, n 45 at 437.
72 Amankwah-Amoah, n 63.
73 Petriglieri JL, “Under Threat: Responses to and the Consequences of Threats to Individuals’ Identities” (2011) 36 Academy of
Management Review 641 at 643. This article identifies two responses to threats: identity-protection responses and identity
restructuring responses.
74 Chatterjee S and Harrison JS, “Corporate governance” in Hitt MA, Freeman RE and Harrison JS, (eds) The Blackwell
Handbook of Strategic Management (Wiley, Malden, 2001).
75 Withers MC, Corley KG and Hillman AJ, “Stay or Leave: Director Identities and Voluntary Exit from the Board During
Organizational Crisis” (2012) 23 Organization Science 835; Daily CM and Dalton DR, “CEO and Director Turnover in Failing
Firms: An Illusion of Change?” (1995) 16 Strategic Management Journal 393; Gales LM and Kesner IF, “An Analysis of Board
of Director Size and Composition in Bankrupt Organizations” (1994) 30 Journal of Business Research 271.
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whilst insolvent,76 which is commonly interpreted to refer to appointing an administrator.77 However,
the defence is a matter of hindsight: the company must subsequently be placed into liquidation for the
cause of action to arise; and the liquidator (or the regulator in enforcing the public aspects of the
liability) has to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to mount the litigation on the company’s
behalf.
In contrast to the VA approach, the debtor-in-possession model provides managers with at least
some opportunity to demonstrate their competence. To be sure, a signal of management failure
remains by virtue of the company entering administration. However, the signal that managers are
incapable of properly managing the company through the distress resolution period is mitigated. While
there is undoubtedly a measure of stigmatisation, an opportunity remains for incumbent managers to
limit its effects in the reorganisation period. To summarise, an identity economics analysis suggests
that the debtor-in-possession policy approach is superior to the administration approach with respect to
ensuring optimal decision-making regarding the timing of entry into insolvency administration.
DISCUSSION
The focus of this article has been to apply identity economics to analyse a single insolvency law
policy issue. Through this article’s identity economics analysis, the authors show that management
decision-making in the context of distress may be improved by an insider alternative to the external
administration approach that exists in the Australian voluntary administration arrangements. However,
the authors suggest that further improvement in the efficiency of insolvency law might be achieved by
a more general consideration of how legal intervention influences the identity dynamic prevalent in
corporations. What is contemplated here is that broadly influencing corporate culture can play a part in
ensuring that managers make decisions in other than a self-interested manner.78 Langevoort describes
the potential value of corporate culture in discussing how “belief systems” that determine the focus of
managers as they make decisions have an important effect on legal compliance.79 He suggests that
corporate culture is most effective when it is internalised or becomes part of a person’s identity in the
manner suggested by Akerlof and Kranton (2005).80 Corporate culture then alters the utility
preferences of individuals, and mitigates the potential for opportunistic behaviour. Indeed, there is
prior evidence that incentives that promote and engage desired identities can provide a measure of
control over actions.81 The difficult question however is how legal intervention can manoeuvre
corporate culture into a position where it might be capable of improving decision-making in the
insolvency context. However, the analysis presented in this article suggests that insolvency policy can
be used to modify behaviour that is inconsistent with the ideal of a competent manager such that there
is a loss of utility when behaviour differs from the ideal.
Substantive consideration of how behavioural economic theory, including the economics of
identity, might inform the development of the many issues that arise in the context of corporate
insolvency is beyond the scope of this article. One suggestion is to emphasise through soft law
provisions the ideal of the competent manager. Nicholson, Kiel and Kiel-Chisholm discuss failures in
the financial system in the context of the global financial crisis. Their research shows how improved
governance of financial institutions might be achieved through the combination of soft law that can
influence social norms and hard law that provides specific regulation.82 Examples of soft law
76 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 588H(5) and s 588H(6).
77 Symes C and Duns J, Australian Insolvency Law (LexisNexis, Sydney, 2009).
78 Langevoort DC, “Opening the Black Box of ‘Corporate Culture’ in Law and Economics” (2005) 162 Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics 80.
79 Langevoort, n 78 at 80.
80 Akerlof GA and Kranton RE, “Identity and the Economics of Organizations” (2005) 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 9.
81 Anteby M, “Identity Incentives as an Engaging Form of Control: Revisiting Leniencies in an Aeronautic Plant” (2008) 19
Organization Science 202.
82 Nicholson G, Kiel G and Kiel-Chisholm S, “The Contribution of Social Norms to the Global Financial Crisis: A Systemic
Actor Focused Model and Proposal for Regulatory Change” (2011) 19 Corporate Governance: An International Review 471.
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initiatives include further development of sector norms through professional associations and an
emphasis on fiduciary duties. Sarra also provides a comprehensive discussion of corporate governance
initiatives for banks that could assist in ensuring a timely, efficient and fair response to financial
distress.83 Her analysis shows the benefits that arise in the context of bank and financial institution
governance from attention to soft law issues such as the quality and representativeness of board
governance, public disclosure, compensation, risk management and sustainability. These are matters
that are already addressed to some extent by corporate regulators, in their explication of best practice
for governance of corporations. The authors suggest that a concerted effort to incorporate and
emphasise these ideals into the framework of insolvency law might make some progress toward
modifying, in a positive way, decision-making around organisational failure. Addressing the issue of
social norms offers a means of improving the operation of VA in the long run.
CONCLUSION
This article presents discussion of how the economics of identity is relevant to insolvency law policy
concerning who should manage a company when it enters insolvency administration. Prior work has
discussed this issue and made suggestions for reform based on an agency theoretical perspective.
However, the agency framework does not provide a complete explanation, and this article shows that
behavioral analysis focused on the economics of identity offers a novel and useful incremental insight.
This analysis demonstrates the substantial opportunity for legal analysis that developing field of
behavioural economics presents. As Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler state, “By drawing attention to
cognitive and motivational problems of both citizens and government, behavioural law and economics
offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis.”84 This article’s identity economics
analysis suggests that adopting the debtor-in-possession approach to management of insolvent
companies, such as occurs with the US Chapter 11 scheme, is preferable to arrangements that sideline
incumbent managers and transfer management to a trustee. This conclusion is reached because of the
stigmatising effect of removing managers, and their consequential loss of identity.
83 Sarra J, “Prudential, Pragmatic, and Prescient, Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes” (2012) 21 International Insolvency
Review 17.
84 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, n 36 at 1471.
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